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Best available copyAbstract 
The  monetary  control  literature has  attempted to explore the effects of 
alternative policies without  succeeding  in incorporating  rational  expectations 
or in integrating analysis of  the money  supply  sector into a complete 
macroeconomic  framework.  The  rational  expectations approach,  while reserving 
a place  for the monetary  control  issues under  the concepts  of  instrument 
(Sargent and  Wall ace 19751,  automatic  stabil  izers  (McCall  um  and  Whi taker 
19791,  and  structural  reforms  (Dotsey and  King 19831,  has  not provided  the 
needed  integration.  Extending earl ier work  by  Hoehn  (1979,  1983b) and 
McCallum  and  Hoehn  (1982,  19831,  this paper attempts  to provide a synthesis of 
the concepts  from  the rational  expectations and  monetary  control  literatures, 
in the context of  a  relatively complete,  if ad  hoc,  macroeconomic model . 
It  is  concluded  that,  under  the most  plausible assumptions concerning  the 
availability and  use  of  information of  various types by  private agents and  the 
monetary  authorities, the monetary  regime--defined  as the conjunction of  the 
open-market  strategy and  the institutional  and  regulatory framework--does 
matter for the distribution of  output,  as well  as of  money,  interest rates, 
and  prices.  On  the other hand,  the rational expectations approach  raises a 
number  of  problems  and  ambiguities  regarding  policy effects that require 
further theoretical  research.  Some  recent efforts along  these lines are 
critical  ly eval uated. 
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in the 1970s  and  early 1980s,  each  spurred by  the experience  of  stagflation 
and  the ineffectiveness of  postwar  monetary  policies.  The  term monetary 
control  1  i terature signifies the analyses of  a1 ternati  ve  money  supply 
behaviors as influenced by  the modus  operandi  of  monetary  policy and  the 
institutional and  regulatory framework.  A  basic premise  of  this 1  i terature 
is that these factors, which  taken  together shall  be  termed  a regime,  are 
- -...-.-  i~~t~~r-tant  determinants of  macroeconomic outcomes.  Thi  s 1  i terature is 
seriously 1  imi  ted by  its narrow focus on  monetary  control  per  se and  by  its 
1  ack  of  full  integration  with macroeconomic  theory.  The  rational  expectations 
1  i terature,  which  has  rev01  uti  onized macroeconomic  theory,  has  exerted 1  i ttl  e 
influence  on  the monetary  control  1  iterature (though it  may  be  on  the 
threshold  of  doing  so).  The  reason  for this may  1  ie in the unreal istic 
concepts of  policy  in the rational  expectations literature, which  seem 
inadequate or simply  inapplicable  to real  world  phenomena.  These  concepts 
have  been  a continuing,  a1 bei t rather unjustified,  source of  skepticism 
regarding  the policy  implications of  rational  expectations--or, more 
general ly,  new  classical --model s and  may  he1 p explain continued  adherence  to 
traditional  policies and  macroeconomic  concepts. 
The  two  1  i teratures have  advanced  independently,  ref1  ecti  ng  the fa1  1  acious 
dichotomy  between  the broad  macro  and  money  market  sectors of  analytical 
models  and  previous  literature and  the infamous  two-stage  policy decision 
sequence.  A  reconciliation between  these literatures will  serve a number  of 
purposes.  First, where  the two  literatures differ in their concept of  policy, 
an  attempt at reconciliation forces careful  reassessment.  It  will  be  seen 
that the monetary  control  literature has,  in some  important ways,  modeled 
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contributions are incorporated  into a  rational  expectations macromodel,  some 
important  1  oophol es in the pol icy  ineffectiveness proposition  wi  11  come  to 
light. 
The  present paper can  be  regarded  as an  extension of  previous  efforts to 
reconcile rational  expectations macroeconomics and  the monetary  control 
1  i terature (by Hoehn  1979,  1983b).  McCal 1  um  and  Hoehn  (1982,  1983), 
Goodf riend  (19831,  and  Goodf riend et a1 . (1983) a1 so deal  with the narrower 
issues of  monetary  control  per se using  the rational  expectations assumption 
in some  way.  Related  work  includes Sargent and  Wallace  (19751,  McCall urn 
(1981,  1984), Dotsey  and  King  ( 19831,  Canzoneri , Henderson,  and  Rogoff  (1983), 
and  Goodf riend  ( 1984b).  These  1  atter papers  1  argely concern  macroeconomic 
issues beyond  the normal  scope  of  the monetary  control  literature. 
I 
I.  The  Monetary  Pol icy Sector  in  Macroeconomic  Model s 
Monetary  pol icy plays an  important  role in  macroeconomic  theories, 
particularly theories of  the business cycle.  A  monetary  policy  sector is 
necessary  to complete a  macroeconomic model.  One  of  the most  important 
advances  in macroeconomics  has  been  that policy  behavior  has  been  modeled more 
and  more  real i stical  ly. 
In  the simple  Keynesian  models  the monetary  policy sector sets the 
interest rate, which  is treated as either fixed or as a  choice  parameter. 
IS-LM  models,  which  include monetarist models  as a  special  case,  assign the 
monetary  policy sector the role of  setting the money  stock.  In  these models, 
the money  stock  is  either fixed or a  choice parameter,  invariant with respect 
to the state of  the economy.  Monetarists gave special  attention to the role 
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they  advocated--versus  randomized  or state-dependent money  supply  behavior. 
Even  though  the monetarists warned  of  the dangers of  fixing interest rates, 
they  did not incorporate such  pol icy  behavior  into their model s. 
The  rational expectations  theorists offered a significant advance  by 
formally  treating monetary  pol icy as the choice of  a feedback  rule.'  In 
their model s, pol icy is typically characterized by  the instrument and  a  rule 
for its behavior,  stated as a function of  state variables.  Sargent and 
Wall ace  (1975) showed  that,  under  rational  expectations and  certain 
assumptions  regarding  aggregate supply  and  demand  behavior,  the time  path  of 
output is invariant with respect to the feedback  rule.2  However,  at  the 
same  time,  the choice of  the instrument does  have  implications for the 
distribution of  output.  Rational  expectations theorists generally continued 
to assign monetary  policy  the role of  setting the money  stock,  because  the use 
of  the interest rate as an  instrument was  believed  to result in the 
indeterminacy  of  nominal  variables.  Like  the monetarists,  rational 
expectations theorists generally emphasized  the dangers of  fixing interest 
rates, and  may  therefore have  preferred  to construct models  employing money 
supply  behavior,  the adoption of  which  they considered  beneficial .  In 
applying their models  to the explanation  of  actual  events,  the rational 
expectations theorists,  like the monetarists,  may  often have confused 
normative  and  positive economics.  Another  reason  for specifying monetary 
policy as a  rule for the money  stock was  analytical  convenience. 
So  a1 though  the rational  expectations theorists offered a significant 
advance over earlier modelbuilders  in their treatment of  the monetary  policy 
sector,  their earl  iest model s were  unequipped  to expl ai  n  or predict economic 
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the  instrument.  This was  a serious limitation.  Not  only  has  the Federal 
Reserve  employed  the federal  funds  rate as the instrument during most  of  the 
period  in which  the  rational  expectations literature has  expanded,  but it is 
also infeasible for the Federal  Reserve  to adopt what  can  be  regarded 
mathematically  as a money  stock  rule unless radical  institutional and 
regulatory  changes  take place.  Indeed,  even  a  total  reserve or monetary  base 
instrument is infeasible under  current arrangements. 
The  major  remaining  barrier to incorporating  both  rational  expectations 
and  an  adequate  policy  sector into macromodels is analytical  and  econometric 
intractability.  A  realistic rule for the federal  funds  rate or nonborrowed 
reserves as a function of  either future expectations of  goal  variables or past 
observations on  state variables  raises the order of  the system  of  difference 
equations that represent  the structure of  the economy  beyond  an  order  that 
permits  derivation of  analytical  reduced  forms  corresponding to the observable 
reduced  forms.  Perhaps more  research will  overcome  the analytical 
difficulties,  but early success cannot  be  anticipated. 
This discussion does  not directly concern  the identification and 
estimation  of  a structural  probability model  of  the macroeconomy.  However,  an 
appropriate  research  strategy for building such  a model  must  include the 
construction of  a  tractable and  simp1 e, yet adequate,  monetary  pol icy sector. 
There  is obviously a  need  for great improvement  in this area.  Development  of 
such  a  model  is essential  if the macroeconomic  1  iterature and  the literature 
on  monetary  control  are to be  integrated.  Without  such  an  integration,  the 
conclusions  of  the literature on  monetary  control  are not secure.  Benjamin 
Friedman  (1975 and  1977) has  shown  that a failure to integrate the broad 
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serious error (even  in  a conventional  Keynesian  model  in policy  analysis. 
11.  A  Reconsideration of  the  Instrument  Concept 
The  problem  of  monetary  pol icy  is  that of  designing  a rule--that is',  a 
procedure  for adjusting policy instruments--that responds  to incoming 
information  to minimize  deviations of  objective variables from  their targets. 
The  only  rational  approach  to this design  is  to construct a complete 
structural  probabi 1  i ty model  that 1  inks pol icy instruments to the ul  timate 
objectives.  In  practice,  the objectives have  included  stabilization of 
output,  prices,  money,  and  interest rates. 
A  pol icy  instrument  is a variable that the Federal  Reserve  can  control 
directly and  precisely.  It  must  be  immediately observable,  or it cannot  be 
controlled  precisely.  In  the traditional  use  of  the term,  and  in an  ultimate 
sense,  monetary  policy instruments include open-market  operations,  all aspects 
of  di  scount-wi ndow  admi ni  stration,  reserve  requi rements,  and  various other 
regulations such  as deposit-rate ceilings.  But, of  these,  only open-market 
operations are flexible enough  to employ  on  an  essentially continual  basis. 
In  recent literature, the term  instrument has  been  used  to signify a1 ternative 
criteria of  open-market  operations.  The  alternative instruments are 
essentially quantity-setting or interest-rate-setting rules of  behavior. 
While  in principle a relation between  a quantity and  a rate, similar to 
Poole's combination  pol icy,  can  serve as the operational  criterion of 
open-market  operations,  and  i n  general  shoul d, analytical  i  nsi ghts are often 
faci  1  i tated by  contrasting pol ar cases of  quantity  versus  rate-setti  ng  pol icy 
behavior  (see Poole 1970).  An  additional  reason  for considering  these polar 
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cases is that they  have  sometimes  described actual  policy. 
The  value of  the instrument is kept constant only  so long as it remains 
consistent with the ultimate objectives.  When  new  information about 
deviations of  target variables  is received,  the instrument  should  be  reset, an 
action termed  feedback.  Information  is, in principle,  conveyed  by  observed 
movements  in -  all of  the observable variables,  both  exogenous  and  endogenous, 
that enter into the complete  structural  probability model.  The  model  tells us 
how  the instrument must  be  reset to be  consistent with the objectives, 
conditional  on  the set of  observed  realizations.  Feedback  cannot be 
continuous or immediate,  because most  information  is conveyed  only at discrete 
intervals:  there is  an  information  lag.  In  addition,  because  some  time  is 
required  to f i 1  ter information  and  execute  the appropriate instrument 
resetting,  there is also a decision lag.  In  practice,  the decision lag is 
lengthened  by  bureaucratic or committee  behavior.  Instrument  resettings are 
often made  only after a broad-based consensus develops  among  non-analytical 
policymakers  that such  a  resetting is needed.  The  instrument issue exists 
precisely because  feedback  cannot be  instantaneous and  continuous.  The 
Federal  Reserve  must  have  some  criterion for actions between  points of  time at 
which  new  information  becomes  available,  can  be  processed,  and  used  to make  a 
new  decision.  Policy cannot be  asked  to do  nothing  in the interval, unless 
doing  nothing  is defined. 
The  instrument  problem  and  the feedback  problem  are complementary;  in that 
together they  make  up the complete  problem  of  policy design.  Consequently,  a 
correct conception  of  the instrument problem  requires an  understanding  of 
feedback--in  particular,  we  must  have  an  accurate understanding of  which 
information  is  available to the pol icymaker,  with which  1 ags. 
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been  widely misconceived  in several  respects.  Most  important,  many  economists 
have  confounded  the feedback  and  instrument  problems.  Many  influential 
studies of  the "instrument  issue
1'  implicitly or explicitly have  sought a 
variable,  which,  if pegged  without  feedback,  would  more  closely achieve the 
goal s than  if a1 ternati  ve  variables were  pegged  permanently.  This  natural ly 
1  ed  to an  unwarranted  bias against i nterest-rate-setti  ng  rules,  because  they 
require more  feedback  in  a cyclical  context.  Instead,  the instrument  should 
be  chosen  strictly on  its ability to insulate the goals from  unknown 
disturbances.  Past disturbances can  be  imputed  from  available data  in 
conjunction  with the model,  and  it is the proper  role of  feedback  to offset 
the impact  of  known  disturbances. 
An  associated misconception  is of  the time  horizon  relevant to the 
i nstrument  choice  problem.  That  horizon  is the information  (and decision) 
lag.  Unfortunately,  a practical  separation  between  instrument  and  feedback 
issues is  complicated  by  the different frequencies with which  information 
becomes  available.  The  instrument  concept of  recent 1  iterature is simply 
' 
inapplicable without  information or decision  lags,  for otherwise  feedback  can 
and  should  be  continuous.  The  nature of  the instrument choice  problem  depends 
as critically on  the assumptions  about  information  availability as it does  on 
the other structural characteristics of  the model. 
Given  the conception of  the pol icy  problem as that of  responding  to 
information,  the reserve accounting period is a useful  means  of  separating  for 
information  that is  currently avail able and  information  that is available only 
with a  lag.  (The  reserve accounting period also corresponds to the period of 
the traditional  adjustment mechanism  inherent  in reserve requirements. ) 
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prices,  and  the family  of  reserve aggregates.  It  will  be  assumed  here  that 
the information lag on  these variables is one  or more  reserve accounting 
periods.  On  the other hand,  the Federal  Reserve  is assumed  to have  perfect 
current information  on  the securities in its portfol io (the open-market 
position) and  on  the federal  funds  rate.  In  addition,  the pol icymaker  has 
partial  know1 edge of  the so-call  ed  uncontroll able factors affecting reserve 
supply  (float, Treasury  cash,  currency,  and  so on), excess reserve demand,  and 
borrowed  reserve demand.  The  way  the Federal  Reserve  uses immediately 
available information will  be  thought of  here as an  operating procedure,  a 
concept  related to the instrument  but more  descriptive. 
The  particular information structure assumed  is a central  feature of  the 
analysis.  Besides  the obvious  advantage of  being  expl i ci  t, the specific 
assumptions  made  will  facilitate analysis of  the effects of  alternative 
operating procedures  and  regulatory factors on  the control  of  money 
especially,  but in a broader macro  context in which  the objectives  involve  the 
stabil  i ty of  interest rates, prices,  and  output. 
I  11.  An  Analytical  Framework 
This section develops  a model  of  the instrument issue that is dynamic  and 
incorporates rational  expectations of  prices.  Its dynamics are rather simp1 e, 
exploiting the idea  that 1  agged  behavioral  responses  are more  important  for 
the  feedback  issue than  for the instrument issue.  While  this notion 
facilitates analysis of  instrument  issues,  it will  be  necessary  to consider 
ways  in which  the instrument and  feedback  issues cannot  be  entirely separated 
in a rational expectations model.  A1  1 variables are measured as deviations 
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and  polynomials  in the time  index. 
A  serious limitation of  the model  is that it  does  not account  explicitly 
for changes  in the "structural  "  parameters  and  di  sturbance variances that 
would  occur as the policy  regime  is altered.  In  other words,  the model  is, 
1  i ke  virtual  ly every other analytically tractable model , subject to the 
we1 1  -known  Lucas  (1976) critique.  Consequently,  the sensitivity of  resul ts to 
likely changes  in parameters  should  be  assessed.  In  many  relevant practical 
situations,  this can  probably  be  done,  and  illustrations will  be  given  below. 
Quantitative simul ations using existing money  market  model s, while interesting 
and  suggestive,  do  not lead  to secure conclusions without  this kind of 
sensitivity analysis. 
Aggregate commodity  demand  is taken  to be  a negative function of  the ex 
ante real  rate of  interest and  is subject to a white-noise  disturbance: 
where 
y  =  natural  log of  output, 
r =  federal  funds  rate, 
p  =  natural  log of  the price level, 
and t is  a reserve accounting  period time index. 
Expectations of  inflation are taken  to be  equal  to the objective expectation 
of  the next  period's price 1  evel , conditioned on  a1 1 1  agged  ( t-1) 
real i  zations,  mi  nus  the current (actual )  price 1  evel .  Later,  the imp1 ications 
of  a1 1  owing  the pub1 ic to form  future price expectations based  on  current 
observations wi  11  be  examined. 
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(2)  Yt  =  s  (pt  -  Et-l  pt)  +  Upt,  s>o. 
Output supply  responds  positively to price level  surprises and  is subject to a 
whi te-noi se disturbance.  There  are at 1  east three justifications for thi  s 
aggregate supply  function  (see McCallum  1980,  pp.  720-1).  First, the 
accel erationi  st or expectations-augmented  Phi  11 ips curve of  Friedman,  Phel ps, 
and  others;  second,  Lucas'  island parable,  if agents only  know  the current 
local  price plus any  lagged  information;  and  third, as a single-equation 
representation  of  Keynesian  econometric wage-markup  price equations. 3 
The  key  contention here  is  that, for the  issues addressed  by  the monetary 
control  1  i terature,  the Sargent-Wall ace supply function is more  appropriate 
than  available a1 ternatives,  such  as those  that begin  with the Lucas  island 
parable  but a1 low  agents to respond  to information  contained  in the interest 
rate.  The  assumption  that private agents either do  not observe  or do  not 
respond  to elements  of  the information  set available to the Federal  Reserve 
results in a preservation of  the relevance  of  the monetary  regime  for output 
stabil  ization.  Some  rational  expectations theorists,  such  as Barro  (1976) and 
Dotsey  and  King  (19831,  have  explicitly noted  that superior information  by  the 
Federal  Reserve  can  form  a basis for output stabilization policy.  These 
theorists,  however,  have  been  deliberately  reluctant to make  such  an  allowance 
of  superior information  in their analyses.  This  reluctance arises from  the 
contentions that (a) the policy of  releasing the superior information to the 
pub1 ic is essenti  a1 ly equivalent to feedback  in terms of  stabi  1  ization 
effects,  and  that  (b) in any  case,  such  information  hardly  forms the basis for 
stabilization of  the countercyclical  type advocated  by  Keynesians  or that 
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irrelevant  in the context of  monetary  control  issues.  But contention  (a) must 
be  careful ly considered. 
It  might seem  that prompt  release of  the Federal  Reserve's fragmentary 
observations on  reserve and  deposit data would,  by  el imi nating the Federal 
Reserve  information advantage,  render the monetary  policy  regime  irrelevant. 
But that surely cannot  be  the case:  the policy regime  also influences what 
kind of  information  is generated and  how  it is processed.  For  example,  the 
recent switch  of  reserve  requirement accounting altered the kind of 
information  flowing  to the Federal  Reserve  from  the banking  system  and  sped it 
up.  Regulatory  issues such  as this fall into the category of  structural 
reform as conceived  by  Dotsey  and  King  (1983).  But the other aspects of  the 
regime,  the instrument and  feedback  rules,  can  reflect a more  efficient 
processing of  information  than can  be  accomplished  by  private agents alone. 
It is probably  not economic  for private agents to index  contracts fully to 
reflect all  variations in, for example,  float, Treasury cash  balances,  and 
currency  flows.  Yet  each  of  these reserve supply  factors can  distort the 
information conveyed  by  the interest rate and  other prices.  There  would 
appear  to be  economies of  scale in processing  information  that can  be 
exploited  by  the Federal  Reserve.  The  benefits derived can  be  distributed 
widely  by  appropriate manipulation  of  interest rates.  An  interesting question 
not yet adequately  addressed  is whether  such  information processing is a 
pub1 ic good.  If  not,  there may  be  no  justification on  grounds of  economic 
efficiency for a public monopoly. 
The  aggregate  supply  function,  in conjunction  with rational  expectations 
and  the aggregate  demand  equation,  ensures that the familiar "policy 
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behavior of  output will be invariant with respect to  policy feedback. 
However,  operating procedures  and  regulatory factors can,  by affecting the 
distribution of price 1  eve1  surprises,  have  imp1  icati  ons  for the behavior  of 
output.  Thus,  Sargent  and  Wallace  suggested,  the instrument choice is 
generally consequential  for output even if  feedback  is  not.  It  will be  shown 
later that the importance of the instrument,  or,  more broadly,  of the policy 
regime,  is  robust with respect to  a number  of re-specifications of the 
aggregate supply  equation. 
The money  demand  equation is  quite conventional , except  that it  is 
expressed as  a first-order Taylor expansion or linear approximation: 
(3) mt  =  alpt  +  a2yt  +  a3pt  +  et,  al<O,  a?,  a3X, 
where 
m  =  money  (reservabl  e deposits) , 
and  e is a white-noise disturbance. 
The  1 i  neari  ty permits consi  stent use of the (1 i  near)  bal  ance  sheet  identi  ties 
in  the money  supply  sector  of the model. 
The money  supply  sector provides a relation between  the money  stock  and 
the interest rate that is  needed  to  complete the model  and  determine  output, 
price level,  money  stock,  and  interest rate.  This relation can be  termed  a 
money  supply function.  In  general it  has  the form: 
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supply  sector, and  vt  is a 1  inear function of  the disturbances in the money 
supply  sector. 
The  sl  ope  of  the money  supply  function he1 ps determine the way  commodity 
market and  money  market  disturbances affect output,  the price level,  the money 
stock,  and  the interest rate.  All  of  Poole's  (1970) qualitative results can 
be  dupl icated within this model , if an  exact money  supply  rul e replaces the 
money  supply  sector of  the model.  The  use  of  (a) the real  rate of  interest in 
the aggregate demand  function,  (b) an  aggregate supply function of  the 
Sargent-Wall ace  type,  and  (c) rational  expectations does  not destroy Pool e's 
qua1 i tative results,  at 1  east in this model ,  as 1  ong  as Pool e's 1  eve1 s of 
variabl es are converted  to one-peri od  innovations.  (The imp1 icati  ons  of 
aggregate supply  disturbances, which  Poole didn't examine,  are essentially the 
same  as aggregate demand  disturbances,  if output stabilization is the 
objective. ) 
In  addition  to making  these improvements,  the model  here adopted 
facil i tates analysis of  the effects of  a1 ternative operating  procedures, 
reserve requirement  systems,  and  discount  policies.  These alternatives 
influence the slope and  variability of  the money  supply  function and  the 
variances of  y,  p,  m,  and  r.  Hence,  the framework  of  analysis allows an 
integration of  the monetary  control  and  macroeconomic aspects of  analysis. 
The  money  supply  sector comprises four equations:  two  reserve demand 
equations,  a rule for open-market  operations,  and  a reserve identity.  The 
demand  for total reserves is the sum  of  required  reserves,  the fraction  kl 
(reserve requirement  ratio) of  the money  stock,  plus a random  term  * 
W  1,  representing excess  reserves: 
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(5)  TRt =  klmt  +  wtt,  0  < k1<' 
In the case of  contemporaneous  reserve requirements  (CRR), it is assumed  that 
kl  is a  positive fraction.  In  the case  of  lagged  reserve requirements 
(LRR),  it  is assumed  that the demand  for total  reserves  is a  function  of  the 
1  agged  money  stock,  as in: 
(6)  TRt =  klmt-1  +  wft. 
Because  the term  in  mt -  will  not appear  in expressions  for innovations  in 
the endogenous  variabl es,  formal  analysis of  innovations can  proceed  most 
conveniently  by  setting kl  =  0  under  LRR.  As  emphasized  elsewhere,  the 
presence  of  lagged  terms  anywhere  in the model  merely  affects the  optimal 
feedback  and  is not  relevant  to the  instrument  issue. 
Total  reserve supply  is defined as the sum  of  the open-market  position, 
St,  borrowed  reserves,  BRt,  and  the  so-called  uncontrollable factors 
* 
affecting reserve  supply  (lt  +  ht). 
The  Federal  Reserve  is assumed  to have  some  direct information on  the 
uncontrol 1  able  factors,  but not compl ete information.  In  particul ar, when  the 
open-market  program  for the  reserve  accounting period  is determined,  the 
* 
Federal  Reserve  knows  the  portion lt but does  not know lt. 
The  borrowed  reserve demand  equation: 
makes  borrowing  a  positive function  of  the funds rate,  with random  disturbance 
* 
terms  w  and  w 
2 t  2t' 
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operations are carried out,  while  the latter is not.  The  coefficient kp 
represents the response  of  borrowings  to a change  in the funds  rate. 
The  Federal  Reserve's  information  set includes  St,  rt,  A+,,  wZt, 
and  past real i zations of  a1 1 observable  variables,  i ncl udi ng  money,  output, 
prices,  and  the family of  reserve measures.  The  relevant general  form  of  the 
pol icy rule i s then: 
ignoring  the feedback  terms  on  lagged  observations.  Policy  can  (only) choose 
a relation among  the observable  variables and  can  achieve  that relation 
precisely  by  manipulating  the open-market  position.  Different operating 
procedures  can  be  represented  by  different values of  the ci Is.  A  value of 
zero  for c3 characterizes the essentially quanti ty-setti ng  pol icies,  whi  1  e 
an  infinite value  for c3 characterizes  the pure  rate-setting case.  These 
special  cases are represented  by: 
l  and 
respectively.  These  expressions  wi  11  facil i tate the analysis of  a1 ternative 
operating targets,  which  imply  different values  for the ci's or bi 's. 
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kp,  and  cl,  c2, and  c3,  because  policymakers  ultimately exercise 
control  over all of  them.  The  values  of  the ci  characterize the operating 
procedure,  while  the values of  ki  represent  the reserve requirement  system 
and  discount  policies. 
Solving the four equations of  the money  supply  sector (using the general 
form  of  the policy  rule), we  find the following  a1 ternative expressions for 
the money  supply  function: 
-  1  -  1  *  *  * 
(12)  mt  =  kl  (C +k  )r  +k  [(~~+l)~~+(c~+l)w~~-w~~+w~~+~~]  32tl 
for kl#O,  c3<w , 
or 
(13)  rt  =  kl(c3+k2)-lmt 
-1  *  *  * 
+(c3+k2)  [w~~-w~~-A~-(c~+~)A~-(c~+~)w~~J, 
for (c3+k2)&0. 
The  first expression  makes  explicit that the pol icy  regime  uniquely determines the 
slope of  the money  supply  function  (4): 
In  addition,  kl,  cl,  and  cp help  determine  the variance of  the disturbance, 
"t'  in the money  supply  function.  One  immediate  result is that the optimal 
value of  both  cl and  cp is -1.  This is seen  by  observing  that such  a value 
for cl  and  c2 ellminates  ,xt  and  wpt  from  the money  supply  function. 
Another  obvious  result is that k2 and  c3 appear  addi tively.  Open-market 
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as policy  tools,  but one  of  them  is redundant.  An  implication  is that "reforms" 
of  the discount window--for  example,  those  that would  result  in  a  zero  value  for 
k2--need  not influence  the determination  of  money,  the  interest rate,  output, or 
prices,  if the  rule of  open-market  operations  is changed  in  an  offsetting manner. 
Reserve  requirements (given  by  the  ratio kl)  and  open-market  operations  (imp1  ied 
by  c3) -  are distinct policy  tools,  however. 
The  semi -reduced-form  sol utions for the endogenous  variables in  the model  are 
given  be1 ow  -for the  general  case of  the  pol icy  rule.  A  wide  variety of  regime 
changes  or  reforms can  be  analyzed  using  these equations: 
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where 
1 
J  =  [(  S-d) ( alkl-k2-~3)+dk1(a2s+a3]-  . 
Determinacy  of  Nominal  Magnitudes 
Perhaps one  reason  that an  analysis of operating procedures was  not performed 
in the context of  a  rational  expectations model  was  that most economists 
accepted the Sargent and Wall ace  (1975) argument:  within such a  model , 
nominal  magnitudes  are i ndetermi nate under an i nterest-rate rule,  regard1  ess 
of  feedback.  Economists of  different views  toward  rational  expectations 
responded  differently to the Sargent and Wall ace argument.  Some  of  those 
opposed  regarded it  as a  cause for skepticism about either rational 
expectations or the Sargent and  Wallace model,  since it was  well  known  that 
the  Federal  Reserve  in practice operated by  fixing the funds rate.  The  notion 
seemed  to be  that if the price  level were  indeterminate, it should have 
behaved  more  wildly than it did.  On  the  other hand,  proponents of rational 
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indeterminancy  result as a strong argument  in  favor of  quantity-setting  policy 
behavior.  Some  of  these proponents  either dismissed  as impossible that the 
Federal  Reserve  used  the funds  rate as the instrument,  or concluded  that the 
Federal  Reserve  pol icy was  responsible for observed  price instabil i ty. 
Nevertheless,  the Sargent and  Wallace  argument  should  never  have  been 
understood  to imply  that a pure  quanti ty-setting rule is optimal.  It  merely 
suggests  that the Federal  Reserve  should  adopt a policy  regime  that results in 
some  slope to the money  supply  function.  Even  a very  slight positive or 
negative slope  brings  determinacy.  In  terms  of  the analysis of  Sargent and 
Wallace,  B  of  equation  (4) must  be  finite, or the money  supply  function is a 
pure  rate-setting equation  that is not  sufficient to determine money  or prices 
in a rational  expectations model.  The  coefficient  B  does  not  have  to equal 
zero. 
McCallum  (1981) upset the Sargent and  Wallace  result by  showing  that if 
the feedback  rule reflected some  degree  of  concern  over  the money  stock  in 
some  future period--a case that seems  relevant--then nominal  magnitudes  are 
determinate after a1 1  .  McCal 1  um' s  resul t can  be  general i zed,  so that feedback 
that reflects any  degree of  concern  for -  any  nominal  variable-- prices  in 
particul ar--yiel ds  determinacy .  Hence,  the view  that the Federal  Reserve  must 
be  concerned  about money  per se,  or any  other  nominal  intermediate target,  to 
achieve determinacy  is not correct.  Nevertheless,  the determinacy  issue gives 
us  an  interesting example  of  how  the instrument and  feedback  issues cannot 
a1 ways  be  analyzed  independently  in  a rational  expectations model . 
In  the interpretation made  here,  a proviso is required that in cases where 
the policy  regime  results in  a  perfectly elastic money  supply  function,  the 
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policy  rule's feedback  reflects a degree of  concern--no  matter how  small--for 
some  current value of  at least one  of  the nominal  variables:  either money  or 
prices.  Interestingly,  a funds  rate-setting regime  is only  one  of  several  in 
which  indeterminacy  arises in the absence of  this proviso.  As  will  be  shown 
be1 ow,  regimes  with LRR  or a borrowed  reserve target will  a1 so yield a 
perfectly elastic money  supply  function. 
Before discussing some  implications of  the model,  it is useful  to look  at 
some  generalizations  that can  be  made  without  affecting results,  as we1 1 as 
some  of  the model '  s  1  imitations. 
Behavioral  Lags 
All  of  the  results derived  with this mode1  for the innovations  in  y,  p,  m,  and 
r would  be  unaffected  if any  terms  involving  lagged  realizations of  variables 
were  added  to the equations.  In  the innovation  form  of  the model--sometimes 
referred to as a mapping  into expectations space--which  recasts the variables 
as deviations from  prior expectations,  all of  these lagged  terms  drop  out. 
Hence,  the  LRR  case can  be  handled  by  simply  setting kl equal  to zero.  That 
lagged  terms can  be  ignored  greatly facilitates analysis of  the instrument 
question  in contexts where  the feedback  problem  is very  complicated.  It  is 
the role of  feedback  to deal  with lagged  terms or disturbance 
autocorrel  ations.  A  simi 1  ar result is derived  if the disturbances are 
replaced with moving  average  processes. 
A1  ternati  ve  Aggregate  Supply  and  Aggregate  Demand  Specifications 
Because  the appropriate specifications for aggregate supply  and  aggregate 
demand  are the subject of  considerable controversy,  it is useful  to assess how 
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changes  in specification. 
The  innovation form  of  the aggregate  supply  function is: 
The  aggregate supply  equation  can  handle  a fixed-output assumption,  by 
setting s  =  upt  =  0.  It  can  also handle  supply  behavior  that sets the price 
level  inflexibly one  period  in advance  by  taking the limit of  reduced  form 
solutions as the elasticity of  aggregate  supply,  s, approaches  infinity.  Most 
re1 evant  imp1 ications of  different pol icy  regimes  are qua1 i tatively simi 1  ar in 
these cases,  although  solution expressions  for the endogenous  variables are 
considerably  simpl ified.  A  so-call  ed  Keynesian  supply  function,  in which  the 
prior expectation of  pt  is eliminated  from  the expression,  results in 
exactly the same  innovation  form  for aggregate supply.  The  Sargent  and 
Wall ace supply  function is not critical  in analyzing the instrument  question 
in this model.  Any  supply  behavior  that makes  output  innovations a function 
of  innovations  in the price level  yields the same  qualitative results--in 
particular,  it does  not matter whether  the so-called long-run  Phillips curve 
is vertical  or not,  or even  whether  the more  restrictive rational  expectations 
or natural  rate hypotheses  are accepted.  Of  course,  these latter hypotheses 
have  powerful  implications regarding  the effects of  feedback. 
The  aggregate demand  equation's  innovation  form  is: 
(23) yt  =  d(rt +  pt)  +  ult. 
A  simp1 er innovation  form  obtains  if the operator  Et -  is placed  in front of 
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the current price level  when  inflation expectations  (which  go  into the 
calculation of  the ex  ante real  rate) are formed.  In  this case,  pt  is 
eliminated from  the innovation  form  of  the aggregate demand  equation.  The 
zero-inflation case that Poole  studied,  or one  in which  prices are 
predetermined  one  period  in  advance,  results in the same  exclusion  of  pt 
from  the innovation  form.  Solutions  then  become  considerably  simpler,  but 
results for the innovations of  y,  m,  and  r  under  a1 ternative instruments or 
operating procedures  are,  in many  important ways,  qua1 i  tati  vely simi 1  ar. 
The  results derived  from  the model  are sensitive to the specification  of 
the aggregate demand  equation  in one  respect:  if expectations of  the future 
price level  are formed  with  any  current information on  p,  y,  m,  or r, the 
innovation  form  of  the aggregate demand  equation involves the innovation  in 
the expectation of  future prices  ( Etpt+l-Et-lpt+l  1,  which  is not 
general ly zero  (McCall  um  and  Hoehn  1982,  1983).  This expression  generally 
depends  on  the feedback  rule and  other lagged  terms  throughout  the structural 
equations,  and  the neat analytical  separation between  the instrument problem 
and  the feedback  problem cannot generally be  made.  A  wide  variety of  special 
cases and  curious results then  becomes  possible--and has  appeared  in the 
1  i  terature--but none  has  much  general i  ty  . 
The  bothersome  expression can  be  eliminated if the expectation of  the 
future price level  is invariant with respect to current observations. 
Goodfriend  (1984b) characterizes this restriction as trend-stationari  ty , and, 
in  formal  analysis , 1  inks it to the absence of  base  drift in  money.  However, 
trend-stationarity, as defined  by  Nelson  and  Pl osser  (19821,  requires merely 
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is less restrictive than  the condition that the future expectation  be  a fixed 
target-- that is, that the price level  tends to return  immediately  to a 
predetermined  trend.  If  the restrictive condition  is met,  the expectation of 
the price level  at time t+l,  formed  at time  t-1,  will  not  be  revised  at time 
t.  Thus,  the bothersome  term  is identically zero  and  does  not appear  in the 
innovation  form  as before. 
There  are other ways  to get rid of  the  bothersome  term.  If  the only 
current information going  into future price level  expectations is the interest 
rate (a reasonably  plausible case,  and  one  of  those examined  by  Canzoneri, 
Henderson,  and  Rogoff  (19831,  the term  will  then  vanish  if the interest rate 
does  not actually convey  any  information  about  the future price level.  That 
will  occur if the money  supply  function  is horizontal  and  nonstochastic:  if 
the rate is fixed  by  a pol icy  rule,  then  its innovation  is zero,  and  it  cannot 
relay any  information.  If the policy  regime  results in a stochastic, 
horizontal  money  supply  curve  (such as under  LRR  or a borrowed  reserve 
operating target,  as currently employed) , then i nterest-rate innovations 
reflect self-reversing disturbances to the reserve market.  One  might be 
tempted  to conclude  that, once  again,  the current interest rate conveys  no 
useful  information  about  the future price level.  However,  this conclusion  is 
not warranted.  Funds  rate innovations due  to reserve market  shocks 
destabilize  p,  y,  and  m and  therefore  relay  information  about current values 
of  those variables.  Unless  the feedback  in the policy  rule implies fixed 
future expectations of  prices,  that information will,  in general,  affect 
future expectations of  the price level. 
In  cases other than  these,  a feedback  rule that permits  the price level  to 
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and  the real  rate are determined,  lead  to a rather intractable analytical 
probl em  if there are 1  agged  terms  in the model.  The  resul ts of  the Federal 
Reserve  adopting  feedback  that permits  non-trend-stationary  behavior  for 
nominal  magnitudes  is an  important  topic of  current research,  and  it is 
possible that some  results derived from  the model  will  be  upset for the case 
in which  private agents  use  current information  sets.  It is quite possible 
that the direct results and  intuitions we  have  from  Poole's analysis will  not 
prove  re1  evant  in a dynamic  rational  expectations framework. 
Recent  theoretical  and  empirical  results suggest that this 
trend-stationarity restriction of  the model  is a potentially serious one  if 
private agents use  current information  sets.  Goodfriend  (1984b) argues  that 
tension  between  objectives of  price-level  and  interest-rate stabilization can 
create a strong motive  for non-trend-stationary  policy  rules.  The  analysis of 
a non-trend-stationary  model  requires great simp1 ici  ty.  Goodfriend  manages  it 
by  reducing  the number  of  disturbances to two  and  the number  of  structural 
parameters  to four,  two  of  which  characterize pol icy.  However,  Goodfriend's 
analysi  s has  some  unsati sfyi ng  aspects.  A  sufficiently high  degree of 
interest-rate smoothing  will  always  require a negative  kind of  base  drift in 
money  and  prices;  that is, to keep  nominal  interest rates stable,  this 
period's accommodative  increases  in money  wi  11  have  to be  foll  owed  by  1  arger 
decreases  in  money  in the next  period.  This seems  empirically implausible as 
well  as counterintuitive.  But it  may  be  a result of  the assumption  that the 
real  rate is exogenous,  or, equivalently,  that output is  fixed despite 
aggregate demand  fluctuations.  McCall um  (1984) notes,  in a discussion of 
Goodfriend,  that the inability of  contemporaneous  accommodation  to achieve 
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exogeneity  assumption.  Despite  these limitations and  troubling implications 
of  the model,  Goodfriend  illustrates the point that intuitive and  seemingly 
sensible results can  be  overturned  in  rational  expectations models  if (a) the 
pub1 ic exploits current information  sets, and  (b) the Federal  Reserve  a1 lows 
drift in the price level  from  a predetermined  trend  path.  Empirical  results 
of  Nelson  and  Plosser  (1982) suggest that the price level  has  not  been 
trend-stationary,  at least in  the sense of  a straight-1  ine trend. 
In  principle,  one  can  escape  this problem  by  adopting  a trend-stationary 
money-supply  rule.  In  practice,  however,  this will  not achieve  the necessary 
trend-stationarity of  prices unless money  velocity is also trend-stationary. 
Financial  innovation  appears  to render velocity non-trend-stationary, and 
Nelson  and  Plosser find velocity cannot  be  regarded  as having  a linear trend. 
Given  the theoretical  ambiguities,  it is tempting  to suggest running 
experiments on  the economy  to answer  seemingly  intractable analytical 
questions.  Yet,  opinions vary  about whether meaningful  experiments  (such as 
the one  beginning  in October  1979) have  actually been  run,  and  about  how  to 
interpret the results.  The  varying  views  spring from  theoretical 
disagreements and  ambiguities.  Hence,  it  seems  unlikely that experimentation 
alone will  solve the analytical  problems.  As  further support  for this 
contention,  consider  the skepticism among  many--the  refusal  to face the 
fact--that the Federal  Reserve  was  really using a funds  rate instrument  in the 
1970s,  given  the (mistaken) theoretical  belief  that such  a pol icy was  either 
impossible or extremely  i 11 -advi sed!  Only  McCall um' s modification of  the 
Sargent and  Wallace  indeterminacy  argument  cleared the disbelief  among  some. 
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The  remainder  of  this paper considers  particular issues of  the monetary 
control  1  i terature within the context of  the complete  rational  expectations 
macroeconomic framework. 
A  first result is that,  in the case of  a pure  rate-setting rule,  the 
pol icy  rule -  is the money  supply  function.  None  of  the other money  supply 
sector equations  is needed  to determine  the money  supply  function,  and  hence 
play  no  part  in determining  p, y,  m,  or r.  They  merely  determine  various 
reserve quantities given  the equilibrium  values of  those variables.  The 
values of  kl  and  k2  (and their real -world  variabil i ty) and  variances of 
money  supply  sector disturbances are inconsequential.  Issues  related to LRR 
versus  CRR,  the Depository  Institutions Deregul ation and  Monetary  Control  Act 
of  1980,  discount-window  administration,  and  float are irrelevant to the 
behavior  of  the variables of  real  concern.  The  switch  in  1979  to a 
quanti ty-setti ng pol icy  ru1  e made  these issues  re1 evant. 
A  second  result of  generality,  noted  earlier, is that the optimal  value of 
both  cl  and  c2 is -1.  Obviously,  open-market  operations should act to 
offset known  disturbances to the reserve market  arising from  fluctuations  in 
borrowed  reserve demand  and  the uncontrol 1  abl es.  The  optimal  combination 
pol icy will  establ ish as the criterion for open-market  operations  the 
condition: 
where  c3 is the optimal  response of  the open-market  position to r.  As 
intuitions derived  from  Poole's  analysis suggest,  the optimal  value of  c3 
depends on  the objective function  and  all of  the structural  parameters and 
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disturbance variances.  (For example,  if output  stabil  ization is the 
objective,  c3 should  be  larger,  the  larger money  demand  and  reserve market 
disturbances are relative to aggregate demand  and  aggregate supply 
disturbances,  and  so  forth.  Such  results are too familiar to repeat here.) 
One  can,  in principle,  find  the optimal  value of  cg for any  objective 
function defined  on  the variance of  innovations  in  p,  y,  m,  and  r. 
The  re1 evant comparison between  pure  quantity- and  rate-setting rul es i  s 
between : 
and 
A  1 imitation--not so  much  of  the model  itself,  but rather of  the analysis 
conducted  here  with it--is that the opportunity  the Federal  Reserve  has  in 
pursuing  a reserve operating  target of  extracting  information  about  unobserved 
reserve market  shocks  from  the observed federal  funds  rate will  not  be 
considered.  In  practice,  the Federal  Reserve  should,  and  apparently  does,  use 
such  information  (see Wallich  1984,  p.  27).  To  illustrate with  a simple case, 
suppose  the  reserve measure  serving  as an  operating  target is Rt,  and  i ts 
demand  is: 
where  f>O and  e  is an  unobserved  disturbance  term.  Let  the supply  be  the  t 
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representing  uncontroll abl e  factors affecting supply: 
The  Federal  Reserve  observes  St  and  rt,  but not  Rt,  whose  control  it 
seeks.  Consider first the pure quanti ty-setting rul e: 
In  this case: 
(30)  Rt=vt, 
2  with variance 0,.  On  the other  hand,  with a  reserve supply  rule of  form: 
then 
with variance 
2  -22,  2  -2 2  (33)  VARIR)  = f  (f-9)  u  9  (f-9)  oe, 
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Hence,  the policy  rule that achieves closest control  of  the reserve operating 
target is actually a combination  policy. 
In  the context of  the complete  model,  the  reserve market cannot  be 
is01  ated as  in the above  illustration.  The  reduced  form  reserve demand 
equation  represents the simultaneous  interaction of  all the parameters  and 
disturbances  in the model.  The  choice of  g to stabilize R  becomes 
analytically intractable  in the general  case.  More  importantly,  incorporating 
this into the analysis of  operating  targets blurs the useful  distinction 
between essentially rate-setting versus essentially quanti ty-setting pol icy 
behavior.  In  any  case,  an  application of  Occam's  razor is needed  somewhere. 
It  would  be  desirable to trace the analysis to its most  elementary  nuts and 
bolts;  the Federal  Reserve  ought  to do  so.  However,  the structure of 
information flows to the Federal  Reserve  cannot  be  adequately  known  to an 
"outsider" such  as this writer.  It  must  be  conceded  that this can  become  a 
serious problem  in the analysis of  a1 ternati  ve  pol icy  regimes,  particularly to 
the extent that regime changes are associated with changes  in the structure of 
information flows  avai 1  able to the Federal  Reserve. 
In  descriptions of  decisionmaking  at the Federal  Reserve,  it is often said 
that the Federal  Reserve  takes  part of  the adjustment  to information,  seeming 
to imply  that cl  and  cp are something  less than  unity  in absolute 
magnitude.  A1 ternatively,  this could  be  interpreted as a different use  of  the 
term  information  than  used  here.  The  Federal  Reserve  may  have  noisy  data 
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(which it  calls "information")  that it  filters to get information (which 
constitutes the "adjustment"  to the reserve path). 
Now  we  consider some  a1 ternati  ve  operating procedures  that have  recently 
been  in  effect or proposed.  As  will become  clear,  none  of the popular 
proposals considered for particular operating procedures is  optimal ;  each 
involves discarding information.  This result imp1  ies that an  optimal  pol  icy 
system  will not permit a simple description and  partly explains why  confusion 
over  the open-market  policies actually employed  has  been  widespread. 
Total  reserve operating target.  If the Federal  Reserve  attempts  to 
control total reserves,  it  sets: 
where 
It  includes St,  rt,  kt,  wZt.  This is  achieved by  setting: 
c1  =  c2 = -1,  and 
c3 = -  k2,  or 
This rule has  the term in rt only because  changes  in  the funds  rate raise 
(observed)  borrowed reserves  to prevent known  fluctuations in  borrowings  from 
affecting total reserves;  the open-market  position must  be  adjusted by  an 
off  setting amount. 
The  result,  assuming  kl  f  0 (CRR),  is  a strictly supply-determined money 
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This policy has  the desirable property  that known  fluctuations  in  the 
uncontrol  lables (ht)  and  in  borrowed  reserve demand  (k2rt  +  w~~)  are 
offset.  But the policy is  not optimal,  unless by  chance  the optima1  c3  = 
I 
-k2  '0.  This is  a possibility,  but is  not very likely,  even if  monetary 
control  is  the sole objective,  because it  gives full  force to the reserve 
*  *  * 
market  disturbances wit,  w~~,  and  ht. 
If  k  - 0 (LRR),  then a total reserve operating target results in  an  1 - 
undefined money  supply  function.  Yet many  monetarists were  calling for such a 
target,  even  without conditioning it  on  a return to CRR!  If their advice had 
been  taken,  p,  y,  m,  and r would have  been  indeterminate.  This is  a different 
kind of i  ndetermi  nacy  than nominal  indeterminacy,  because  real  variables woul d 
also be  indeterminate,  and because it  does  not depend  on  the nature of 
feedback.  It must be  admitted,  however,  that such  an  extreme  policy would 
make  some  loopholes in  the argument  important.  These  loopholes relate to 
i  reserve carryover provisions,  as  of  adjustments,  and  the timing of  borrowing. 
These  1  oophol  es i  nvol  ve  pal  1  iati  ve  actions by  bank  reserve management  that 
I  "lean against" interest-rate movements.  It seems  clear that they can  only 
mi  tigate and  not eliminate the magnified interest rate and  other instabi  1  i  ties 
arising from a poorly designed pol  icy regime.  As  proof  of  this proposition, 
it  suffices to consider that if  the instabilities were  completely  eliminated 
by  bank  behavior,  there would be  no  incentives for such  actions by  the banks. 
Nonborrowed,reserve operating target.  A nonborrowed  reserve operating 
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which requires cl  = -1 and  c2 =  c3 =  0,  or 
This is  inefficient because it  ignores known  shifts in  borrowed reserve demand 
(~~~1.  The  resulting money  supply  function is  an upward-sloping  (assuming 
kl#O)  and  stochastic relation between  mt  and rt: 
for k2 #  0. 
But if  kl  =  0 (LRR) , the money  supply  function becomes  a horizontal,  yet 
still stochastic,  relation: 
for k2 f  0. 
Hence,  under LRR,  a nonborrowed  reserve operating target is  equivalent to  a 
stochastic  funds  rate peg. 
On the other hand, if  CRR  were  in  effect,  and  the discount rate were  tied 
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for kl  #  0. 
This money  supply  function is vertical,  but subject to greater stochastic 
influences  than  under  the total  reserve operating  target,  because  known 
borrowed  reserve demand  shifts  (wet)  are ignored.  If  both  k2 and  kl  are 
zero  (LRR and  a tied,  or penalty,  discount  rate), then  prices,  output,  money, 
and  the interest rate are indeterminate  (thei  r variance is indefinitely 1  arge) . 
Another  feature of  the nonborrowed  reserve operating target is that it 
inefficiently ignores any  information  about  excess  reserve  demand.  Although 
the model  assumes,  for simplicity,  that the Federal  Reserve  has  no  such 
information,  in practice it  often has. 
Borrowed  reserve target.  A  borrowed  reserve  target i.s equivalent to the 
condi ti  on : 
By  renormal i zi  ng  this condition,  we  arrive at the money  supply  function: 
-  1  (44)  rt =  -k2  wZt, 
for k2t0. 
This is equivalent to the special  case of  the "pure"  funds  rate rule with 
bp  =  -kil.  This target is obviously  inefficient,  because  it permits 
the funds  rate to fluctuate in response  to known  disturbances  in borrowed 
reserve demand.  It  also obviously  does  not "lean against" commodity  market or 
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borrowing  target del i vers  a  money  supply  function that is horizontal  and 
stochastic--a "dirty"  funds  rate pol icy. 
Under  LRR,  the  borrowed  reserve  target is less inefficient than  a 
nonborrowed  reserve target.  The  borrowed  reserve  target,  unlike  the 
nonborrowed  reserve target,  insulates  the money  supply  function  from 
unobserved  fluctuations in excess  reserves,  uncontrollable  factors affecting 
reserve supply,  and  borrowed  reserve  demand.  Under  CRR,  these advantages of  a 
borrowing  target must  be  weighed  against  the  "1 eani ng against"  properties of 
the  nonborrowed  reserve target. 
Free  reserve operating  target.  A  free reserve operating  target is 
identical  to a  borrowed  reserve  target,  in  the  (assumed) absence  of  any 
information  about fluctuations  in excess  reserves.  Hence,  like a  borrowing 
target,  it  is less inefficient  than a  nonborrowed  reserve  target under  LRR, 
and may  be  more  or less inefficient  than a  nonborrowed  reserve  target under 
CRR. 
The  October 1979 Regime  Change 
The  regime  change  that occurred  in October  1979  involved  two  major  elements. 
First,  the operating  procedure  shifted from  a federal  funds  rate rule  to a 
quanti ty-setting ruq e.  Second,  the  nature of  the  feedback  was  fundamentally 
altered.  Our  model  is best suited  to analyze the  former. 
In  terms  of  the  instrument  issue,  the 1979  shift was  highly 
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lagged reserve requirements.  The  regime  change  altered the policy rule from: 
(45)  rt =  0, 
where  the latter reflects  the attempt by  the Federal  Reserve  to offset known 
changes  in  uncontroll  abl  es  and borrowed reserve demand  (Levi  n and Meek  1981  1. 
The  money  supply  function then became: 
A  comparison of equation (47) with equation  (45) yields an  immediate 
conclusion.  The  adoption of a quantity rule under  LRR  ushered in  a regime 
that offered inferior potential control  of money,  relative to the funds rate 
regime  and,  in  addition,  increased the variance of innovations in  interest 
rates.  Empirically,  the change  in  operating procedures  was  associated with at 
least a  doubling of  the coefficient  of  variation in  the entire maturity 
spectrum of interest rates  (Hoehn  1982).  The  standard deviation of monthly 
percentage  growth rates in  MI,  adjusted for  shifts to negotiable order of 
withdrawal  (NOW)  accounts,  rose by  about  one-third (Hoehn  1983b1,  as  shown  in 
table 1. 
A similar conclusion holds  for  the variances of innovations in  output and 
the price 1  eve1 :  they  shoul d have  increased,  regard1  ess  of the objective the 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copypol  icy rule was  intended to satisfy.  That is  because  under  LRR,  the optimal 
value of cg is  infinity for any  objective function defined on  the variances 
of  y,  p,  m,  and r.  The  reason can  be  explained quite simply:  under LRR,  the 
money  supply  function is  horizontal.  Macroeconomic  events cannot affect the 
interest rate without delay,  as  they would under  CRR.  They  do  so  under  CRR 
(given a fixed open-market position) by,  for example,  raising the quantity of 
money,  in  turn raising the demand  for reserves,  and  thus raising the funds 
rate.  This 1  ink was  delayed under  LRR  for two weeks,  by  which time 
appropriate feedback  could be  administered in  any  case.  On  the other hand, 
reserve market  disturbances create fluctuations  in  the interest rate.  The 
result is  a money  supply curve that is  horizontal and  therefore cannot  "lean 
against" macro  disturbances,  yet the position of that curve is  disturbed by 
the reserve market  shocks.  It would be  unambiguously  better,  given that the 
money  supply curve i  s horizontal , to fix  the rate to prevent it  from 
fluctuating unhelpfully in  response  to reserve market  disturbances.  This 
explains why  the optimal  combination pol  icy has  cg equal  to infinity--  a 
pure rate-setting rule after a1 1  .  This result obtains regard1  ess of the 
objective function. 
Some  went  so  far as  to argue  that,  under  LRR,  there was  no  money  supply 
function at a1 1.  According to  Porter,  Lindsey,  and Laufenberg  (1975) : 
... under  lagged reserve accounting,  the textbook  supply  of 
demand  deposits  function does  not exist:  there is  no 
independent  avenue  for reserve injections to affect the 
equilibrium level of  deposits in  the same  week  other than by 
operating through interest rates and  deposit demand. 
Marshall's  scissors has  lost one  of its  blades  (p.  4). 
.  .  . no  relation.. .exists..  .to  relate the current week's 
demand  deposits,  nonborrowed reserves,  and  interest rates 
that is  not dependent  on  the demand  deposit function  (p.  40). 
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not exist, essentially  because  one  cannot  renormalize the reserve demand 
equation  to express the current quantity of  money  as a function of  the current 
level  of   reserve^.^  But the apparent suggestion  is that under  LRR,  the 
money  stock  is strictly demand-determi ned.  Thi  s i s incorrect.  The  money 
demand  function gives us  a relation between  the money  stock  and  the interest 
rate,  but is not  sufficient to determine  the quantity of  money.  If  the 
interest rate is given  by  the horizontal  money  supply  function of  LRR,  then 
money  demand  and  supply  jointly can  determine  the quantity.  If  the horizontal 
money  supply  function is affected by  reserve market  shocks,  then  the supply 
curve  is doing  as much  cutting as the demand  curve.  In  the model,  the only 
case  in  which  the money  stock  is strictly determined  by  either demand  or 
supply occurs when  the money  supply  curve is  vertical,  as in the case of  CRR 
and  a total  reserve operating target.  Then  the money  stock would  be  strictly 
supply-determined,  and  the rate would  be  determined  by  both  supply  and  demand. 
Laurent  (1984) suggests  that one  need  not suppose  the existence of  a money 
demand  function  at all to understand  how  the quantity of  money  is determined. 
Laurent's model  has  not  been  formalized,  but appears  to lack  an  adequate 
number  of  equations  to determine  equilibrium  in the money  market  and  the 
quantity of  money.  Inclusion of  a money  demand  equation would  complete  the 
model .  On  the other hand,  Kopecky  (1984), in  an  exchange  with Laurent,  seems 
to propound  the notion  that the concept  of  money  supply  is not  a useful 
analytical  concept.  His  model  is quite explicit,  but his  use  of 
the concept  of  money  demand  seems  confined  to the determination of  the 
currency-to-demand  deposit and  time  deposi t-to-demand  deposit ratios in 
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familiar models  such  as that of  Burger  (1971), who  considers his a "money 
supply" model!  Indeed,  there does  not appear  to be  any  fundamental  difference 
between  Kopecky' s  and  Burger's model s. 
It  must  be  confessed  that,  in a model  in which  the pub1 ic can  hold  money 
in the form  of  currency  and  different deposits with different reserve 
requirement  ratios,  the di  stincti  on  between  demand  and  supply  becomes 
probl emati c.  If the model  were  expanded  to incorporate thi  s heterogeneity  in 
money,  the distinction drawn  between  demand  and  supply  sectors would  be 
bl urred.  However,  qua1 i tatively similar results could be  derived.  The 
incl usi on  of  currency,  coup1 ed  with 1  agged  vault cash  accounting,  creates 
somewhat  more  troubl ing analytical  probl ems.  Neither  of  these issues seems 
critical to consider  to understand  the essential  nature of  equi 1  i bri  um. 
A  source of  confusion  in the 1  i terature and  financial  press was  the 
supposition  that increased  i nterest-rate vol ati  1  i ty per  se woul d  be associated 
with  more  precise monetary  control.  Greater  interest-rate vol atil  i ty may  be 
associated with tighter money  control ,  yet simply  increasing the vol atil  i ty of 
the funds  rate does  not necessarily improve  the control  of  money.  Such  a 
result depends  on  the nature of  the interest-rate volatility.  The  increased 
range  of  movement  in interest rates improves  money  control  if it  represents 
greater responses to deviations of  money  from  its target path.  But if the 
increased variabil i ty of  interest rates is unrelated to money  demand  shifts, 
as  in the case of  a reserve market  disturbance affecting the funds  rate,  then 
the increased  variabil i ty worsens  money  control.  A  similar kind of  argument 
against interest-rate volatility per se can  be made  if the objective is price 
or  output stabilization.  What  the 1979  policy  did,  from  the standpoint of  the 
instrument  issue,  was  simply  to randomize  funds  rate innovations,  rather than 
set up  a mechanism  for "1  eaning  against" money  demand  or commodity  market 
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It was  possible  to predict  that the 1979  pol icy  would  be  accompanied  by  a 
reduction  in  the elasticity of  borrowed  reserve demand,  k2,  under  given 
administrative guidelines  for the discount  window.  As  the  variance of  the 
funds  rate increased,  banks  spread  their limited  borrowing  privileges over  a 
wider  range  of  funds  rates.  A  given  rise in the funds  rate (relative to the 
discount  rate) led  to less of  an  increase in  borrowings.  While  this 
suggestion  represents  only  an  informal  motivation  for expecting  a  lower 
elasticity,  a more  rigorous analysis  has  been  offered by  Goodfriend  (1983) 
that seems  to imply  the same  result.  Furthermore,  empirical  observation  seems 
to suggest  that the elasticity did decline  (see charts 1,  2,  and  3). 
This  kind  of  structural  change  worsened  monetary  control  beyond  what would 
have  been  expected  from  a fixed-parameter model.  Given  LRR,  the only  way 
excess supplies or  demands  for reserves due  to reserve market  disturbances 
coul d  be  el imi nated  (barring any  el astici  ty in excess  reserves) was  by  changes 
in borrowing  induced  by  fluctuations  in the funds  rate.  Just  how  far the 
funds  rate must  move  to clear the market  depended  on  the  magnitude  of  k2. 
As  borrowed  reserve demand  becomes  less el astic, the funds  rate moves 
further.  What -  a1 so  apparently  happened  was  that the  borrowed  reserve  demand's 
disturbance  term  increased  in  variance.  These  two  structural  changes  are 
strongly  suggested  by  the  observed  relation between  borrowings and  the spread 
between  the funds  rate and  the discount  rate.  These  changes  in the structure 
of  the model,  brought  about by  the change  in  operating  procedures,  suggest 
that simulations  based  on  fixed-parameter models  that try to assess the  impact 
of  a1 ternati ve  instruments may  1  ead  to quantitatively quite inaccurate 
results.  Work  on  the microfoundations of  reserve demand  behavior is another 
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of  alternative operating procedures.  However,  it  will  be  exceedingly' 
difficult to integrate fully such  analysis into a complete  structural 
probability model.  We  may  have  to resort to ad  hoc  "patchups,"  accounting as 
best we  can  for likely changes  in parameters  and  variances. 
One  direct imp1 ication of  this discussion is  that,  under  LRR,  any 
so-called reform  of  the discount  window  that reduced  the magnitude  of  k2 
would  not only  destabilize p,  y, and  interest rates,  but would  a1 so  reduce 
monetary  control.  In  fact, a regime  in which  k2 were  zero would  lead  to 
indeterminacy  of  p, y,  m,  and  r.  This is a different kind of  indeterminacy 
than  occurs under  a funds  rate peg  without  feedback,  for not only  are nominal 
magni tudes  indeterminate,  but so are real  variables.  The  indeterminacy  now 
results from  the inability of  any  funds  rate to clear the reserve market. 
Consequently,  the money  supply  function is undefined.  The  discount window  is 
the only  safety valve for reserve market  disturbances under  LRR  with a 
quantity-setting rule.  A  discount  rate tied to the funds  rate or closure of 
the window  a1 together would  each  constitute such  a regime  in which  K2 
equaled  zero.  The  monetarists should  not  have  advocated  such  so-called 
reforms  without predicating  them  on  a return  to CRR. 
Wal  sh  (1984)  suggested  that the increase  in i nterest-rate vol atil  i ty would 
a1 so  be  associated  with a decrease  in the elasticity of  money  demand.  Such  a 
change  would,  it seems,  reduce  the control  errors arising from  reserve market 
disturbances and  associated  interest-rate changes.  On  the other hand,  it 
would,  given  1  arge sel  f-reversi  ng money  demand  function  shifts, create further 
instability in interest rates,  prices,  and  output.  Hence,  such  a decline  in 
the elasticity of  money  demand  woul d  probably  be  unhelpful , unless monetary 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copycontrol were  desired for its  own  sake. 
Wal sh' s  results,  however,  appear  to depend  critical  ly on  the absence  in 
his model  of a nonmoney  asset with a positive and certain rate of  return. 
Thi  s  feature is  crucial ,  because,  in  his model,  money i  s  essentially he1  d  for 
portfolio rather than transactions reasons.  Furthermore,  a  decline in  money 
demand  elasticity was  not empirically observed after 1979.  While it  would be 
surprising if  the money  demand  function were  entirely invariant with respect 
to pol  icy, it  is  very  difficult to model  the demand  for transactions media  in 
a completely adequate  analytical fashion,  from  first  principles rather than 
starti  ng  from curves. 
A1 though the October  1979  policy was  not promising in  terms  of the 
instrument issue,  its  feedback  properties were more  promising.  By  using the 
level of nonborrowed  reserves rather than the funds rate as  the benchmark  for 
feedback  decisions from one  reserve period to the next,  feedback  apparently 
allowed far less scope  for base  drift in  the money  stock.  Hoehn  (1983a)  found 
evidence that the Federal  Reserve's  feedback  implied a  faster  response  of the 
funds  rate to fluctuations in  money  growth.  This result was  anticipated in  a 
timely and  prescient article by  Judd and  Scadding  (1979).  Borrowed or free 
reserves  a1 so  became  more  closely related to changes  in  money  growth. 
The  overall  assessment  of  the 1979  procedure,  then,  is  that the Federal 
Reserve  tried harder  through stronger feedback  to keep  the money  stock  on its 
annual  target path after initial money  deviations took place,  but the 
procedure permitted 1  arger initial deviations to occur.  It is  hard to judge 
whether  the new  procedure  was  a net improvement,  despite improved feedback. 
(Money  and  other variables became  more  unstable,  but one  can  argue  that other 
causes were  at work.) 
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accomplishing  given  objectives, and  there was  much  in the 1979  modus  operandi 
to criticize on  technical  grounds.  An  important unanswered  question  about  the 
1979  procedure is whether  appropriate feedback  could  have  been  delivered 
without adopting a  regime  that had  extremely  poor  operating characteristics. 
To  the extent that the Federal  Open  Market  Committee  (FOMC)  tends  to confuse 
instruments and  targets in the way  suggested  by  Judd  and  Scadding  (1979), 
appropriate feedback  depends  on  choosing  an  instrument that proxies for the 
target as closely as possible over  cyclical  and  secular timeframes.  But to 
the extent that the  FOMC '  s continuing confusion merely  ref1  ects the continuing 
confusion  among  economists of  the feedback  and  instrument  issues,  it  will 
become  possible to design and  adopt  pol icy  regimes  with appropriate feedback 
without the problems  associated with the 1979  procedure,  as economists  come  to 
make  clearer distinctions. 
Another  critical  issue is whether  some  types of  feedback  are really more 
appropriate  than  others,  or in  what  sense  they are more  appropriate.  In  the 
formal  model,  the  kind of  (lagged) feedback  is of  consequence  to neither 
output  nor  innovations  in any  endogenous  variables.  In  more  Keynesian 
model s--for example,  with mu1 ti  period  contracts as  in  Fi  scher  (1977) or Tayl or 
(1979)--the type of  feedback  will  be  important  for output stabilization. 
V.  More  Recent  Operating  Procedures and  the  Imposition  of  Partially 
Contemporaneous  Reserve  Requirements 
The  procedure  in  effect from  the fall of  1982  until  the institution of 
parti  a1 ly contemporaneous  reserve requirements  in  February 1984  apparently 
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reserves as  the operating  target.  The  nonborrowed  reserve  target implied  that 
the criterion of  open-market  operations was: 
Under  LRR,  this resulted  in  money  supply  behavior  that determined  the  rate 
accordi ng  to  : 
which  allows  the  funds  rate to vary  with reserve market  shocks,  but not in 
response  to commodity  market  or money  market  shocks.  This  is another  variant 
of  the  "dirty"  funds  rate peg. 
When  CRR was  adopted,  the  Federal  Reserve  announced  its intention  to 
maintain  unchanged  operating  procedures.  But the anticipated uncertainty 
among  banks  regarding  their reserve  positions during  the  first few  reserve 
periods  was  expected  to increase  both the level  and  the  variance  of  excess 
reserves.  It was  appropriate  to adopt  a  procedure  for offsetting expected 
fluctuations  in excess  reserves.  As  shown  in equations  (43) and  (441,  a 
borrowed  reserve operating  target,  as opposed  to a  nonborrowed  reserve 
operating  target,  has  this property.  In addition,  it  automatically  offsets 
any  unexpected  but observed  or  known  current fluctuations  in excess  reserves. 
Hence,  the  anticipated  problems  of  the  transition  to CRR  may  have  prompted 
reconsideration  of  the  nonborrowed  reserve operating target.  Apparently  the 
Federal  Reserve  in  fact moved  to a  borrowed  reserve operating  target after the 
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Best available copyreimposition of  CRR,  even  beyond  the  initial  transition period.  The 
properties  of  such  a  regime  have  been  analyzed above:  it is equivalent  to a 
"dirty" funds  rate rule,  with the funds  rate target dependent  upon  known 
disturbances  in borrowed  reserve demand.  Obviously,  since  such  a  dependence 
is unhelpful,  a pure  funds  rate rule woul d  constitute a  better operating 
procedure.  But a  comparison  of  equations  (44) and  (49) makes  clear that the 
borrowed  reserve  target (under either LRR  or  CRR)  is an  improvement  over  the 
nonborrowed  reserve  target under  LRR.  And  furthermore,  the  switch  from  a 
nonborrowed  reserve  to a  borrowed  reserve operating  target as  CRR  was 
instituted may  have  been  an  improvement  over  maintenance  of  the  nonborrowed 
reserve operating  procedure.  This  contention will  appear  paradoxical,  since 
it  has  been  contended  above  that the  October  1979  regime,  which  incorporated  a 
nonborrowed  reserve operating target,  would  have  been  improved  upon  by  a 
reimposition  of  CRR. 
To  explore  this paradox,  it is useful  to suppose  the  nonborrowed  reserve 
operating  target had  been  maintained  as  CRR was  imposed.  With  CRR 
reinstituted,  the same  operating  procedure would  have  implied  an  upward  slope 
to  the one-period money  supply  curve: 
A  clear imp1 ication is that the character or distribution of  sources  of 
interest-rate fluctuations would  have  been  quite different than  under  LRR, 
despite continued employment  of  the  nonborrowed  reserve operating  target. 
With  this money  supply  sector,  r  is exposed  to all  the disturbances  in the 
model,  whereas  it  was  exposed  only  to reserve market  shocks  before.  The 
response of  r  to reserve market  shocks will  be  muted,  however,  because  in 
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mechani sm  invol vi  ng  changes  in requi red  reserves  a1 so comes  into pl  ay . 
Nevertheless,  it  seems  likely that the overall  effect on  the variance of  r 
would  have  been  an  increase.  At  least this would  have  been  true if the only 
change  had  been  to unlag  reserve  requirements. 
One  implication of  the new  upward  slope in the money  supply  function would 
have  been  that the variance of  one-period  innovations  in the money  stock  would 
have  been  reduced  in this model , given  a preponderance  of  money  demand  shocks 
relative to money  supply  shocks.  And  it  might appear  that,  by  giving money 
supply  an  upward  slope,  reintroduction of  CRR would  have  brought  an 
improvement,  whether  our objective were  to stabilize p,  y, or m,  because  r 
would  lean against commodity  market  and  money  demand  shifts.  But there are at 
least three reasons for doubting  this, as follows: 
First, assuming  borrowed  reserves continued  to serve as the benchmark  for 
feedback  from  one  period  to the next,  any  response of  r  to macroeconomic 
disturbances would  have  been  reversed  in the subsequent  reserve  period.  So 
reinstitution of  CRR  under  the same  operating procedures  would  essentially 
have  just increased  the range of  self-reversing  fluctuations  in the funds 
rate.  For  example,  a shift in aggregate  demand,  aggregate  supply,  or money 
demand,  whether  temporary  or permanent,  would  have  affected the rate only  for 
the current  reserve period  (the rate would  have  had  a memory  of  only one 
period)  unless  the borrowed  reserve benchmark  were  systematically a1 tered.  In 
this context,  the favorabl e conclusion derived from  our  model  seems  especi a1 ly 
dependent  on  the exclusion of  the current interest rate from  the public's 
information  set in forming  inflation expectations.  That exclusion is once 
again of  no  consequence  if the price level  fluctuates randomly  around  a 
stationary trend,  but the assumption  is quite implausible when  borrowed 
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Best available copyreserves are used  as  the benchmark  for feedback  adjustment to  the nonborrowed 
reserve operating target.  The  trend-stati  onari  ty assumpti on  woul d be more 
plausible if  nonborrowed  reserves  or total reserves were  used as  the feedback 
benchmark,  as  in  the 1979  procedure. 
The  consequences  of re1  axing the trend-stati  onari  ty assumption  are 
impossible to  establish with certainty.  A conjecture is  that the increase in 
sel  f-reservi  ng fl  uctuations would reduce  the information content of the 
interest rate,  and  lead to  greater instability in  prices,  output,  and money. 
Second,  the recent change  in  reserve regulations did considerably more 
than  simply unlag reserve requirements.  It  a1 so doubled  the reserve period, 
preserved a two-day  lag,  allowed expanded  carryover privileges,  changed  the 
flow and  timing of deposit and  other information available to  the pol  icymaker, 
and  so  on.  It is  harder  to  assess  the overall impact  of all of these changes 
taken together.  Reserve  requirements  (kl)  were  also changed  at the same 
time. 
Goodfriend  (1984a)  notes that the two-day  lag between  computation and 
maintenance  periods under  the current system  of so-called contemporaneous 
reserve requirements  can,  under certain open-market pol  ici  es,  compl etely 
eliminate the potential advantages  of CRR.  If  the Federal  Reserve  stabilizes 
the funds rate or otherwise abandons  its  reserve targeting in  the last two 
days  of the maintenance  periods,  banks  wi  11 engage in i  ntertemporal  arbitrage 
in the reserve market so  that the funds rate will be  determined  strictly by 
banks'  expectations  of the Federal  Reserve's  funds  rate target in  these two 
days.  An  interesting implication is  that if  the Federal  Reserve  interpreted 
the funds rate's level in  the first  12  days  as  conveying information from the 
market,  and  then  stabilized the rate in  some  degree in  the last 2  days,  the 
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the rest of  the world  through  a window,  the Federal  Reserve would  be  seeing 
itself in a mirror--albeit a "funny-house" mirror.  The  reflection would  be 
distorted by  the market's inability to comprehend  fully where  the Federal 
Reserve's  funds  rate target is. 
Third,  the nonborrowed  reserve operating target would  probably  have  too 
much  current-period  response of  interest rates to money  movements,  given  the 
current economic  environment.  If income  or price level  stabilization is the 
objective,  and  if money  demand  is volatile and  therefore serves as a poor 
proxy  for the unobserved  price and  output level, exposing  the interest rate to 
fluctuations caused  by  money  demand  shifts in the manner  implied by  current 
operating  procedures  might increase instability in  p  and  y.  Under  LRR,  funds 
rate innovations were  unaffected by  disturbances to aggregate demand  and 
supply  or money  demand.  Under  CRR,  funds rate innovations will  reflect all 
such  di  sturbances.  The  exposure  to money  demand  disturbances i s  obviously 
unhelpful,  although it cannot  be  avoided,  if responses to aggregate demand  and 
supply shocks  are to be  all  owed.  This wri ter'  s intuition is that the degree 
of  responsiveness of  the interest rate to the three shocks  taken  together will 
be  too 1  arge relative to the optimal  response.  In  other words,  because money 
demand  innovations are relatively large,  the optimal  combination  policy will 
be  one  in which  cg is very  high--a1 though  finite, under  CRR--so  the interest 
rate should  respond  very  1  ittl  e.  The  nonborrowed  reserve operating target 
will  all  ow  too much  one-period  response. 
The  restoration of  CRR  has  the effect of  reducing  the optimal  value of  c3 
from  infinity to some  finite number.  Given  the recent environment  in  which 
aggregate demand  and  supply  shocks  (essentially, inflation uncertainty) seemed 
small , and  money  demand  uncertainty was  great,  the optimal  val ue  of  c3 was 
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Best available copyprobably  very  high.  But in an  environment  of  accelerating inflation,  in which 
aggregate demand  and  supply  di  sturbances are 1  arger  re1 ati  ve  to money  demand 
disturbances,  c3 should  be  1  ower.  The  restoration  of  CRR,  together  with the 
Monetary Control  Act  and  reductions  in the variance  of  float, reduces  the 
optimal  value of  c3 and  will  render a pol icy 1  ike that of  1979 more 
attractive in an  environment  of  inflation uncertainty. 
VI.  Concluding  Remarks  on  Recent Operating  Procedures 
This discussion has  emphasized  how  theoretical  analysis of  operating 
procedures  can  be  very  mi  sl eading if it  ignores regul atory and  insti  tuti  onal 
factors.  Casual  empiricism  can  also lead  one  to the wrong  conclusions,  if the 
interactions of  operating  procedures,  regul atory and  institutional  factors, 
and  the scope  and  nature of  feedback  (both "discretionary" and  "automatic") 
are over1  ooked.  For  exampl e: 
(1)  The  1979  policy  procedure was  not a fair test of  how  well  a 
reserve-based  procedure can  control  money  without excessive interest-rate 
vol atil  i ty  , because  it was  conducted  without  benefit of  reforms  since 
instituted.  Those  who  concluded  from  the experience  that a reserve-based 
pol icy cannot  improve  monetary  control  are ignoring  the interaction of 
operating procedures  and  the regul atory and  institutional  factors. 
(2)  The  recent switch  to  CRR  under  current operating procedures  is not 
likely to result in any  improvement  in  monetary  control  or stability of  the 
macroeconomy.  Undoubtedly,  some  will  conclude that the switch  to  CRR  is 
inconsequential .  Once  again,  this conclusion would  ignore the interaction 
between  operating  procedures  and  regul atory and  insti  tuti  onal  factors.  A 
complete structural  analysis of  the type made  here suggests  that CRR  can  only 
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lower  for the optimal  combination  policy  under  CRR  than  the minimum under 
LRR--except  in the special  case where  the optimal  policy  is  a pure 
rate-setting rule.  In  short,  CRR  improves  the operating characteristics of 
optimally designed  pol icy rules--perhaps  not  in  a dramatic way,  but in 
re1 ation to benefits that are economy-wide--on  a $3  trill  ion  base--almost 
certainly greater than  the few  mil 1  ions it  costs. 
Footnotes 
1.  Optimal  control  theorists of  the Keynesian  school  had  earlier employed  the 
concept of  the feedback  rule.  Unfortunately,  their work  apparently  received 
limited attention in the economic  profession  at  large,  despite the high 
qua1 i ty of  analysis.  Much  of  this work,  as appl ied to monetary  pol icy,  took 
place in the Special  Studies section of  the Board  of  Governors'  Division  of 
Research  and  Statistics, under  the mentoring  of  Peter Tins1 ey,  John 
Kalchbrenner,  and  others.  These analyses are,  of  course,  subject to the 
well-known  "Lucas  critique."  Nevertheless,  they  can  be  seen  as quite 
prescient and  provocative. 
2.  It  was  widely  thought at the time  that the invariance of  the output path 
with respect to the feedback  rule arose strictly from  the particular kind of 
supply  behavior Sargent and  Wallace  posited.  It  has more  recently  been 
recognized  that this invariance result is sensitive to demand  behavior.  For 
the most  lucid treatment of  this point,  see Canzoneri , Henderson,  and  Rogoff 
(1983). 
3.  The  Sargent and  Wallace  supply  function  also generates essentially the 
same  results with regard  to the instrument  issue as does  supply  behavior  under 
Fischer  (1  977)  or Tayl or  (1  979)  wage-contract model s.  This  statement woul d 
not necessarily hold  true,  however,  if private agents  used  current information 
sets in forming  future pri  ce-1 eve1  expectations as discussed  in a subsequent 
section.  These wage-contract models  also have different optimal  feedback 
characteristics and  have  been  used  to upset the policy  ineffectiveness 
proposition. 
4.  Apparently,  Hoehn  (1  979,  1983b) and  McCall um  and  Hoehn  (1  982,  1983) 
performed  the first such  analysis for operating  procedures  in the context of  a 
rational  expectations model. 
5.  See  Burger  (1  971 )  for an  example  of  the textbook  money  supply  function. 
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Best available copyTable 1  Money  Variability Under  the 1979  Pol icy Procedure 
Intra-year M1  -R  variabil i  ty using  original  seasonal  adjustment 
factors,  in standard deviation  of  annualized percent growth  rates 
Fi  scal year( s)  Monthly 
1971 -79  average  6.1 
Quarterly 
3.0 
SOURCES:  Lindsey  et a1 .  , "Monetary Control  Experience Under  the New  Operating 
Procedures,  "New  rlonetary  Control  Procedures - Vol ume  11,  Federal  Reserve 
Staff  Study,  Board  of  Governors  of  the Federal  Reserve  System,  February 1981 ; 
Federal  Reserve System,  February 1981 ; Federal  Reserve Stati  stical  Re1 eases 
H .6,  dated  November  30,  1981 , Apri 1  23,  1982,  October  29,  1982,  and  November 
29.  1982:  Board  of  Governors  of  the Federal  Reserve  System:  and Annual 
statistical Digest,  1980,  Board  of  Governors  of  the federal  Reserve System, 
table 13.  p.  31. 
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Chart 1  Borrowed Reserve  Demand:  October  1976  to September  1979 
Spread 
Borrowed  reserves,  bill  ions of do1 1  ars 
SOURCE:  Board of Governors  of  the Federal  Reserve  System. 
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Chart  2  Borroded  Reserve  Demand:  October  1979  to September 1982 
Spread 
Borrowed  reserves,  billions of  dollars 
SOURCE:  Board  of  Governors  of the Federal  Reserve System. 
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Best available copyChart 3  Borrowed  Reserve Demand  October 1979  to September 1982 
Adjusted for Surcharge 
Spread  - 
Borrowed  reserves,  billions of  dollars 
SOURCE:  Board  of  Governors of  the Federal  Reserve System. 
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